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TRADE FREEDOM AND REVENUE FROM TRADE TAXES: 
A CROSS-COUNTRY ANALYSIS
Trade liberalization as consequence of gradual abolition of tariff  and non-tariff  barriers generally leads 
to the decrease in government tax revenue. In order to estimate the relationship between trade free-
dom level and revenue from trade taxes we used the data for 104 countries worldwide for 2012. For 
further analysis we divide countries into two groups according to their income level as specifi ed in 
the World Bank classifi cation. Also, we investigated the dependence between revenue from taxes on 
international trade and trade freedom in resource abundant countries. We fi nd a signifi cant negative 
correlation between trade freedom and revenue from international trade taxes in low-income and 
lower-middle-income economies which allowed us to make conclusions about economic policy of 
countries at diff erent stages of trade liberalization. Refs 26. Tables 2. Figs 4.




СВОБОДА ТОРГОВЛИ И ДОХОД ОТ НАЛОГОВ НА ВНЕШНЮЮ ТОРГОВЛЮ: 
МЕЖСТРАНОВОЙ СРАВНИТЕЛЬНЫЙ АНАЛИЗ
Либерализация внешней торговли как следствие постепенной отмены тарифных и нета-
рифных барьеров, в целом ведет к сокращению налоговых доходов государства. Для оценки 
взаимосвязи между уровнем свободы торговли и дохода от внешнеторговых налогов в статье 
были использованы данные по 104 странам мира за 2012 г. С целью дальнейшего анализа рас-
сматриваемые страны были распределены на две группы в зависимости от их уровня дохода 
согласно классификации Всемирного банка. Также анализируется взаимосвязь между уров-
нем свободы торговли и доходом от внешнеторговых налогов для стран, богатых природными 
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ресурсами. Результат показал значимую отрицательную корреляцию между уровнем свободы 
торговли и доходом от внешнеторговых налогов для стран с низкими доходами и доходами 
ниже средних, что позволило сделать выводы об экономической политике стран на различных 
этапах либерализации внешней торговли. Библиогр. 26 назв. Табл. 2. Ил. 4.
Ключевые слова: внешняя торговля, налоги на внешнюю торговлю, налоговый доход, свобо-
да торговли, развивающиеся страны, страны, богатые природными ресурсами.
Introduction
Trade liberalization in countries worldwide in the form of gradual abolition of tariff  
and non-tariff  barriers in foreign trade, generally leads to decrease in revenue obtained 
from collection of trade taxes. To compensate the revenue loss by domestic tax receipts, a 
given country should have a well-organized and well-administered tax system. Hence it 
is possible mainly in developed economies where regulatory function of taxation instead 
of the fi scal one comes to the fore. While in developing and transition countries taxes on 
international trade play a signifi cant fi scal role which is primarily conditioned by simplic-
ity of their collection. But at the same time trade taxes signifi cantly distort production and 
consumption choices; so their replacement by domestic taxes, which impose less distor-
tion or ineffi  ciency costs, is required. 
Th us in developing and transition economies it can be assumed that the more liberal-
ized is the economy and the higher is the level of trade freedom, the share of trade taxes in 
total tax revenue declines more slowly. I. e., ceteris paribus, the tax system is able to better 
adapt to the changes.
So, the main purpose of this paper is to estimate the relationship between trade free-
dom level and revenue from trade taxes. It will also focus on some aspects of international 
trade for resource-rich countries. To do this we structured paper as follows. Section 2 re-
views theoretical and empirical research on the impact of trade liberalization on govern-
ment tax revenue. Section 3 provides brief theoretical background of eff ects of tariff s and 
trade liberalization on tax revenue and welfare. Section 4 describes data and methodology 
used for the analysis. In Section 5 we discuss the obtained results. Finally, Section 6 pres-
ents some concluding remarks. 
1. Literature review
Th e largest part of research studies the impact of trade freedom on economic growth. 
See for example Krueger [1974], Rivera, Romer [1991], Chheng [2005], Lundstrom 
[2003], Pogorletskiy, Sutyrin [2010], Auboin [2012], Gorlach, Le Roux [2013], Mahmood 
[2014], etc. Th ese papers usually use a panel data in order to investigate such impact. Th ey 
concluded that trade freedom is highly signifi cant and is positively related to economic 
growth.
Another set of papers studies the infl uence of trade freedom on certain macroeco-
nomic and foreign trade variables, notably on foreign direct investment infl ows to 12 de-
veloping countries of Middle East and 43 other developing countries for 1995–2006 [Be-
heshtitabar, Irgaliyev, 2008], on bilateral trade and RTAs, using an unbalanced panel dataset 
for 33 African countries [Naanwaab, Diarrassouba, 2013], on the economic performance 
of labor and capital productivity for 18 MENA countries over the period 1995–2009 using 
nonlinear Panel Least Squares regression [Emara, 2014], etc.
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Th e investigations studying the impact of trade freedom and income inequality 
should be emphasized separately. 
Norhazlin [2010] examined the issues of income inequality and trade freedom to-
wards economic growth in developing countries using the World Development Indicators 
and 2009 
Index of Economic Freedom data. Th e results of the study established that in some 
cases trade freedom will increase income inequality. 
Batuo and Asongu [2012] using panel data of 26 African countries spanning the pe-
riod 1996–2010, examined the eff ect of liberalization policies with particular focus on 
fi nancial, trade, institutional, political and economic liberalizations on income-inequality. 
Th ey applied two methods, the dynamic panel econometric method and the “before and 
aft er” approach. Generally, their fi ndings tend to suggest that overall the liberalization 
policy reforms have increased income inequality in African countries. Crechet [2012] 
provided an empirical analysis for 45 developing and emerging countries covering a pe-
riod of 1990–1997 and regressed synthetic indexes of inequality on trade, in interaction 
with a measure of fi nancial development. He concluded that trade freedom increases in-
come inequalities in some developing countries. Pérez-Moreno and Angulo-Guerrero 
[2012] examined the relationship between economic freedom and income inequality in 
the 28 EU countries using panel data for the period 2000–2010. Th ey suggested that eco-
nomic freedom seems to entail greater income inequality. But not all areas of economic 
freedom aff ect income distribution similarly. Th us while government size and regulation 
appear to be robustly associated with income inequality, legal system and property rights, 
sound money, and trade freedom are not signifi cantly related with income distribution in 
the EU countries. 
Akin et al. [2014] investigated the relationship between economic growth and eco-
nomic freedom for diff erent income groups using the data for 94 countries covering the 
period 2000–2010. Th ey found a statistically signifi cant positive relationship between the 
level of trade freedom for all income groups and economic growth. 
Empirical research estimating the impact of trade freedom on tax revenue is gener-
ally provided for selected countries and regions, where such infl uence is signifi cant. Typi-
cally this is true for developing and least-developed countries, notably in Africa. See for 
example [Kabbashi, 2005; Pupongsak, 2009; Cottarelli, 2011; Mushtaq et al., 2012; Nwosa 
et al., 2012; Gaalya, 2015] etc.
Some regional level studies were provided for the Middle-East and North Africa 
(MENA) countries [Mansour, 2015]. IMF experts fi nd that from a revenue perspective, 
tariff  policy has evolved toward more liberalization in this region and less reliance on 
tariff s as a revenue source. Trade taxes average about 1 % of GDP in both resource and 
non-resource MENA countries, and they rarely exceed percent of GDP. Th eir share in 
total tax revenues declined from about 26 % in the early 1990s to 15 % in 2012. Th e same 
tendency — decrease of trade tax revenue — according to the Banque de France, could be 
observed in franc zone countries (Pays de la Zone Franc, PAZF) in Africa [La mobilisation 
fi scale dans… 2016].
Th e cross-country studies of Baunsgaard and Keen [2010] and Cage and Gadenne 
[2014] deserve a special mention. Baunsgaard and Keen [2010] used a panel data for 
117 countries over 32 years in order to estimate the compensation of lost revenue (from 
trade liberalization) by income obtained from collection of domestic taxes. Th ey found 
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that high income countries have been recovered those revenues while middle and low 
income countries have been not.
Cage and Gadenne [2014] used a novel dataset on total and trade tax revenues cover-
ing 130 countries from 1792 to 2006 in order to compare the fi scal cost of trade liberaliza-
tion in developing countries and in today’s rich countries at earlier stages of development. 
Th ey concluded that trade liberalization led to larger and longer-lived decreases in total 
tax revenues in developing countries since the 1970s than in rich countries in the 19th and 
early 20th centuries. 
2. Th eoretical background
According to the IMF [Mansour, 2015], tariff  policy as a key element of trade policy, 
is distinct from domestic tax policy in that its primary role is to protect domestic pro-
duction by creating a wedge between prices of imported goods and services and those of 
domestically-produced substitutes.
For developing and least-developed countries tariff s are important for the following 
reasons.
First, they generate revenue which can be important to state budgets, and hard to 
replace when governments liberalize trade.
Second, even when tariff s do not increase signifi cantly the revenue, such as when 
they are prohibitively high or used jointly with quotas, reducing tariff s could have serious 
consequences on the composition of the various tax bases of country’s tax system. 
Th ird, protection provided by tariff s to domestic production sectors may generate re-
turns on investment above normal rates of return (comparing to those required by inves-
tors in markets with perfect competition). Governments may want to tax such economic 
rent at rates above standard rates. 
Fourth, investment tax incentives may be ineff ective when tariff  rates are high on 
imported intermediate and capital inputs; for example, a corporate tax rate holiday may 
be of little use to a fi rm facing a high tariff  rate on imported capital that has no domestic 
substitutes. 
2.1. Impact of tariff s and trade liberalization on tax revenue and welfare
Let’s briefl y examine some approaches to the impact of tariff s (taxes on imported 
goods) and trade liberalization on both tax revenue and welfare in a small open economy. 
On country’s market for one good under free trade, the domestic price equals the 
world price. A tariff  raises the prices of imported goods above the world price by the 
amount of the tariff . Domestic suppliers of good, competing with sellers of the imported 
good, at this stage can sell these goods for the world price increased by the amount of 
the tariff . Accordingly, the price of import and domestic goods — both — will rise by the 
amount of the tariff  and will be closer to the price without trade. 
Th e change in price aff ects the behavior of domestic consumers and sellers. Because 
the tariff  raises the price of good, it reduces the demanded domestic quantity. Conse-
quently, the tariff  will reduce the quantity of imports and will move the domestic market 
closer to its equilibrium without trade. Since the tariff  leads to the increase of the domestic 
price, domestic sellers are better off , and domestic consumers, respectively, are worse off . 
In addition the government’s tax revenue increases.
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At origin, government surplus equals zero. Once a government levies a tariff , the 
domestic price exceeds the world price by the amount of the tariff , eff ectively changing 
consumer and producer surplus, as well as government surplus. 
Additionally the tariff  causes a deadweight loss because a tariff  is a type of tax. Like 
most taxes it distorts incentives and allocation of resources. In this case, it has two eff ects. 
First, when the tariff  raises the domestic price of good above the world price, it encour-
ages domestic producers to increase production. Even though the cost of making these 
incremental units exceeds the cost of buying them at the world price, the tariff  makes it 
profi table for domestic producers to manufacture them nonetheless. Second, the tariff  
encourages domestic consumption, eff ectively inducing domestic consumers to cut back 
their purchases. Th ese two eff ects cause the deadweight loss from both the overproduction 
and underconsumption.
Th us, the introduction of a tariff  in a small open one-good economy reduces con-
sumer surplus, increases the producer surplus and increases the government tax revenue. 
Total surplus is reduced by deadweight loss arising from the overproduction and under-
consumption [Feenstra, 2003; Mankiw, 2014].
Now consider a small open economy with two fi nal goods, importables (M) and ex-
portables (X), where importables and exportables are capital-intensive and labor-intensive 
respectively. Both goods are produced with constant-returns production functions under 
perfect competition. Th e public good is fi nanced via tariff  revenue and other tax revenue.
Figure 1 presents the basic model with an undistorted production frontier (F) be-
tween goods M and X. Th e production at Q0 and consumption at C0 are induced by the 
world price P*. 
Any underlying taxes do not distort these decisions. Th e introduction of an ad valorem 
tariff  at rate τ induces a wedge between domestic and world prices such that Pd = (1 + τ) P*.
Figure 1. Capital tax, consumption tax and import tariff s in a small open economy
S o u r c e :  [Konan and Maskus, 2000].
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Th us, the production shift s to Qτ0  and consumption to Cτ0 , with a reduced trade vol-
ume, while trade is balanced at world prices. In this case, the abolition of the tariff  shift s 
the economy to the free-trade equilibrium and the welfare gain is a pure trade-liberaliza-
tion eff ect. Let’s assume that the economy has uniform tax rates on capital use in the two 
sectors. In a closed economy the output mix must satisfy the demand-determined equi-
librium at a point on the frontier. Accordingly, the change of factor prices would be the 
only response to the introduction of the uniform tax. Similarly, in a small open economy 
the producer equilibrium remains at point Qτ0  by virtue of the fi xed world price ratio and 
tariff  rate. Consequently, for any uniform capital tax rates there must be a suffi  cient change 
in factor prices to support this equilibrium. 
Th e higher is the tax the lower is the return to capital, but for a given tax rate a tariff  
cut would move the economy along the frontier.
Assume now that the economy has diff erential tax rates on capital use and the tax on 
exportables KX is higher than the tax on importables (KM) : tx > tm.
Th ese taxes shift  the economy on F1, since they drive a wedge between the ratios of 
marginal labor and capital products in the two sectors. Th e higher is the ratio tx / tm, the 
larger is this wedge.
Th en, producers face the tariff -distorted domestic price ratio Pd; consequently the 
new equilibrium is established at point Qτ1 . So, the trade must be balanced at world prices, 
implying fi nal consumption equilibrium at point Cτ1 .
Now let’s briefl y analyze the case of trade liberalization with:
— replacement of the tariff  by capital tax;
— replacement of the tariff  by consumption (commodity) tax;
— no changes in the tax policy.
In the framework of trade liberalization the fi rst-best policy is to remove the tariff  and 
also to convert the capital tax into a non-distortionary lump-sum tax in order to replace 
the lost tariff  revenues. 
But in applied settings, the ideal lump-sum tax instrument is unavailable and the gov-
ernment may be constrained to retain the capital tax. If the government does not adjust 
the capital tax rates during trade liberalization, the economy would remain on frontier F1 
with shift ing of the production equilibrium to the Q2 and consumption equilibrium shift s 
to the C2 at world prices. Th e welfare gain from point Cτ1  to C2 could be described as a 
pure trade liberalization gain, conditioned by unchanged capital tax rates.
However, because outputs have shift ed between sectors, there would now generate dif-
ferent levels of capital tax revenue. In order to neutralize this eff ect the tax policy change is 
required. One possibility would be to change tax rates diff erentially, which would change 
the tax proportion tx / tm. 
If the reduction of tax rates is induced since endogenous revenue rises more than 
tariff  revenue falls, the economy would shift  to the production point above Q2, increasing 
welfare at fi xed world prices. If tax rates increase in order to compensate lost tariff  rev-
enue, the economy would shift  to the Q3. Th is means that such tax increase alleviates the 
resource movement from trade liberalization. Consequently this leads to the reduction in 
the welfare gains, and it is possible that welfare could fall below its original level at Cτ1 . 
Such shift ing along the frontier is possible in an open economy with fi xed international 
price ratio, since the rise in the proportional taxes increases the eff ective wedge between 
ratios of marginal products. Th e replacement of the tariff  by capital taxes with a lump-sum 
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tax leads to the shift ing from Cτ1  to C0. And if the policy is only to replace the capital taxes 
with a lump-sum tax but not to liberalize trade, the economy would move from Cτ1  to Cτ0 .
Let’s assume now an alternative taxation possibility with consumption (commodity) 
tax, which is higher on domestic consumption of good M than on consumption of good 
X. In such situation, the consumer price ratio, Pct, exceeds the producer price ratio, Pd, 
which itself is tied to the world price ratio through the tariff . Consistently, production 
and consumption equilibrium lie at Qτ0  and ctC0  respectively, and trade is balanced at 
world prices. Here, removal or unifi cation of the commodity tax, holding the tariff  fi xed, 
would yield a welfare gain from ctC0  to Cτ0  and subsequent tariff  removal would shift  the 
consumption to the C0, producing additional gains. In case where distorted tax rates are 
fi xed, the economy could remove the tariff , shift ing the production equilibrium to the Q0.
When there are both distorted capital and commodity taxes ( ctC1  in Fig. 1), trade 
liberalization could also be accompanied by no tax reform with consumption equilibrium 
on the price line through Q2 or Q3, with a lower consumer price ratio by capital-tax re-
form with consumption equilibrium at ctC2  by commodity-tax reform with consumption 
equilibrium at C2 or C3 and by reform in both taxes with full liberalization outcome at C0.
Finally, consider trade liberalization with no changes in the tax policy. Th is situa-
tion leads to the shift ing from production and consumption equilibrium at Qτ1  and Cτ1  
respectively to the free-trade equilibrium with production at Q2 and consumption at C2. 
Th is change in welfare may arise due to pure trade-liberalization eff ects. But an off setting 
change in the tax structure is required again to maintain revenues.
2.2. Trade liberalization and tax revenue in resource-rich countries
Following to the analysis of World Trade Organization (WTO) experts, since natu-
ral resources are oft en concentrated in a few countries, producers and exporters of these 
resources could benefi t from market power and obtain large rents, notably by restricting 
trade by means of import tariff s, export taxes, quotas or export subsidies.
Economists underline that import tariff s are usually levied by resource importing 
countries in order to extract rents from resource exporting countries (rent-shift ing be-
havior). Th is argument is relevant for natural resources comparing with other types of 
products for several reasons.
First, since resource revenue largely consists of pure rents, import tariff s can be opti-
mal in order to counteract the monopoly power of the resource abundant country. More-
over, usually exporters of natural resource are monopolists and consequently importers 
may enjoy monopsony power.
Second, import tariff s on natural resources cannot generally be justifi ed as import 
substitution strategies, because natural resources stocks, such as oil and minerals, tend 
to be concentrated in relatively few regions and cannot be shift ed from one country to 
another. So, it is evident that the rationale for imposing import tariff s cannot be regarded 
in terms of increase of domestic production
Th ird, since the real available supply of natural resources is unknown, it may be sub-
ject to random interruptions. And import tariff s could be optimal if supplies are subject to 
such interruptions because the higher domestic price could be regarded as premium that 
consumers pay for the vulnerability and uncertainty of imports.
Eckermann et al. [2012] also noted that the import tariff  is to off set additional costs 
incurred by domestic extractors or manufactures that have to pay the resource tax. Th e 
Вестник СПбГУ. Сер. 5. Экономика. 2016. Вып. 2 59
export refund compensates domestic industries for the domestic tax costs they have to 
incur, so as to level the playing fi eld in foreign markets.
But, regardless of the motivations, the imposition of import tariff s will aff ect the dis-
tribution of pure rents associated with extraction. Notably, this is the case of the oil, which 
is available in a fi nite amount and the costs of its extraction are relatively low comparing 
with the initial investment. Th ese high fi xed and low variable costs mean that its supply 
curve is inelastic, i. e. it is not sensitive to price changes. Within this framework, if the 
importing country levies a tariff , the exporting country will have to lower the export price 
(at least as the size of the tariff ) in order to be able to sell the total amount of the resource. 
Consequently, the burden of import tariff  will fall on the exporter. And the higher the 
rent-extracting tariff  imposed by the importing country, the higher the share of the rent 
that it can appropriate. According to Bergstrom (1982), the entire rent can eventually be 
extracted by imposing a high enough tariff  rate, notably when the exporter is a monopo-
list. 
Th ere are a number of factor, determining the size of the rent that can be shift ed from 
the resource-rich exporting to the importing country, notably
the size of the importing country comparing relative to the exporting country: the 
import tariff  tends to be higher the larger the importing country; 
the number of importing countries: generally, the share of the appropriated exporter’s 
rent decreases with the number of importing countries;
the domestic demand for the resource: the size of the rent appropriated by importer, 
depends on the demand for the resource in the resource abundant country, notably on 
the part of local processing industry. If the exporting country can transform the natural 
resource into fi nal goods with high value added within its own economy, then it can re-
spond to the imposition of the tariff  by restricting exports. Since now there is consump-
tion both in the importing and exporting economies, the amount of resource supplied to 
the importing country is no longer fi xed. Consequently, this limits the ability of importing 
economy to obtain the entire rent [Trade policy… 2010].
Collier and Venables [2008] empirically tested the fi scal consequences of tariff s for 
governments with large revenue from resource exports. Th ey showed that in resource 
abundant economies it is likely that import tariff s do not generate net revenue. Th ey also 
analyzed welfare-reducing eff ects of tariff s, arising, notably, in consequence of frustrat-
ing export diversifi cation which is oft en a policy priority for resource-rich countries. So, 
there is a strong case that countries in which tariff  revenue is illusory should have lower 
tariff  rates than those in which they generate considerable revenue. But authors did not 
fi nd such tendency, which allowed them to suggest that tariff s are excessive either because 
the illusory nature of revenue is not appreciated, or because of political advantages accru-
ing to a shift  of revenue between budget headings. And they concluded that in resource-
abundant countries the tariff  revenue is off set by unrecorded reductions in the real values 
of resource rents, and, consequently, the apparent revenue is illusory. 
Th e resource abundant countries, especially developing and least developed ones, 
oft en extensively use export taxes. Th e trade theory considers that there is an optimal 
export tax: such policy may be welfare improving for the exporting country in the natural 
resources sector, since in in a partial equilibrium framework with perfect competition 
and constant returns to scale the optimal export tax is the reciprocal of the elasticity of 
residual demand facing the exporting country. But in the long term export taxes may not 
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be an eff ective tool of maintaining high export prices of natural resources, because, fi rst, 
high world prices could encourage importing countries to invest in new resource-saving 
technologies in order to reduce their needs in natural resource; and, second, high prices 
may also provide incentives to exploit resources that would not be exploited at normal 
prices (in the free trade framework) or to undertake exploration for new reserves [Trade 
policy… 2010].
So, taking into account all mentioned the main point of discussion is to analyze the 
relationship between revenue from taxes on international trade and level of trade freedom 
in countries worldwide. 
3. Data and methodology
Th e trade freedom variable index (as a component of an aggregate Index of Economic 
Freedom) for 2012  is extracted from database of the Heritage Foundation [Trade free-
dom…]. According to their methodology, trade freedom is a composite measure of the 
absence of tariff  and non-tariff  barriers that aff ect imports and exports of goods and ser-
vices. Th e trade freedom score based on two inputs: the trade-weighted average tariff  rate 
and non-tariff  barriers. Share of taxes on international trade in total revenue data come 
from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators (WDI). 
For further analysis in order to estimate the dependence between variables we used 
some econometric tools, notably correlation and regression analysis. 
4. Results and discussion
4.1. Low income and low-middle-income countries
Figure 2 illustrates the visual correlation between the share of taxes on internation-
al trade in total revenue for 2012 and the trade freedom index for the whole sample of 
104 countries. A higher value of trade freedom index equates to lower tariff  and non-tariff  
barriers.
Th is is not surprising that developed countries are situated in the lower right corner 
while most of developing and transition economies are located in the center part of the 
graph. 
So the highly liberalized foreign trade translates to a decrease in trade tax revenue up 
to their absence like in Malta, Austria, United Arab Emirates, and Singapore etc. 
Th en it was of our particular interest to investigate more deeply the relations between 
share of taxes on international trade in total revenue and the trade freedom index for de-
veloping and transition economies. Th e main purpose is not only to confi rm the correla-
Table 1.  Country groups by income
Economy Income, GNI per capita
Low-income economies $1,045 or less
Lower-middle-income economies $1,046 to $4,125
Upper-middle-income economies $4,126 to $12,735
High-income economies $12,736 or more
S o u r c e :  [Taxes on international trade…].
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tion, but primarily to examine the nature of such dependence. According to the classifi ca-
tion of countries by their level of income proposed by the World Bank, we chose from the 
whole sample the low income and the low middle income economies as on 2012 (Table 1). 
Figure 3 presents the correlation between the share of trade taxes in total revenue and 
the trade freedom index for these 39 economies. It should be noted that in developing and 
transition states levying of trade taxes is the prevailing measure of customs regulation by 
contrast with non-tariff  barriers applying in developed countries. 
Figure 3. Taxes on international trade vs. trade freedom in low income middle and low middle 
income countries, 2012
As it can be seen from the Figure 3, here is a signifi cant exponential relationship with 
negative slope and consequently with negative coeffi  cient for the independent variable. 
Th e regression equation is:
y = 608,52e–0,061x
where x and y denote the trade freedom and revenue from taxes on international trade 
respectively. 
It will be observed that the division by geographical distribution is suffi  ciently clear. 
Th us, in the upper left  corner there are a group of Sub-Saharan African countries: Liberia, 
Zimbabwe, Benin, Togo and Central African Republic. For these economies is typical the 
high level of trade taxes and low level of trade freedom. In the lower right corner of the 
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graph there are located transition economies — countries of the former USSR: Moldova, 
Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. So they are closer to the developed 
countries with regard to ratio of the trade tax revenue to the level of trade freedom. 
Th e same analysis made for the upper middle income and high income countries 
showed that the bulk of these economies are located in the lower left  corner of the graph 
as on the Fig. 1, but there is no clear relationship between variables. 
Th e properties of exponential relationship as applied to this graph imply that the rate 
of decline of revenue obtained from collection of trade taxes falls with proportional in-
crease of trade freedom index. Th is means that the higher is the level of liberalization, the 
share of trade taxes revenue in total receipts falls more slowly. 
Th is analysis provided evidence that among low income and low middle income 
economies transition countries have more fl exible tax system (comparing with other de-
veloping countries) which supposes their possibility to compensate the revenue loss from 
trade liberalization by receipts obtained from collection of domestic taxes, like high in-
come (developed) countries. 
4.2. Resource economies and trade liberalization
As it was mentioned above, resource sectors are oft en treated diff erently from other 
economic activities because of their special nature, or being a fi scal incentive aimed to at-
tract investors. According to IMF [Guide on Resource… 2007] resource-abundant econo-
mies should rely on the non-resource fi scal balance, because import tariff s shift  revenue 
from the resource account to the non-resource account. And, consequently, the concept of 
the non-resource fi scal balance unintentionally encourages trade restrictions. 
Analysis of trade and tariff  policy in MENA countries, provided by IMF [Mansour, 
2015], showed that in resource-abundant countries by 2012, both trade taxes and the col-
lected tariff  rate, calculated as ratio of total trade taxes divided by the value of imports, 
have declined more from already low levels in the early 1990s, while the tax base, i. e. im-
port, expanded signifi cantly, from 33 % to over 55 % of GDP as on 2012. Trade taxes have 
not increased or at least remained stable in resource countries for two main reasons: fi rst, 
there are much lower tariff  rates today than in the 1990s, especially in Gulf countries (Bah-
rain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates), where a single common 
external tariff  of 5 % applies to most imports; and second, is the use of exemptions, re-
duced rates and other types of tariff  preferences.
In non-resource MENA countries, there is also a clear and signifi cant decline in both 
trade taxes and the collected tariff  rate, from 5 % in 1990 to 0,5 % of GDP in 2012. But, un-
like resource-rich countries, there is little sign of a signifi cant expansion of the tax base — 
the increase in the early 2000s receded somewhat in recent years, especially particularly in 
Mashriq countries (Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, Syria and Iraq).
We analyzed the dependence between revenue from taxes on international trade and 
trade freedom in top-oil producing countries as on 2012. For this, we’ve chosen 16 coun-
tries from the top 20 oil-producing countries (Table 2). 
Th e availability of relevant data on revenue from taxes on international trade in these 
countries as on 2012 determined the selection of only 16 countries from this list. 
Th e results are presented on Fig. 4. 
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Table 2.  Top 16 oil-producing countries, their level of trade freedom revenue 
from taxes on international trade as on 2012
Country and abbreviation Trade freedom index Taxes on international trade, % of revenue 
Angola (AO) 65,2 3,4
Brazil (BR) 69,7 2,7167
Canada (CA) 87,9 1,24
China (CN) 71,6 15,0713
Ecuador (EC) 68,1 5,31
Kazakhstan (KZ) 79,6 16,89
Kuwait (KW) 81,6 0,8183
Nigeria (NG) 63,9 5,49
Norway (NO) 89,3 0,2181
Oman (OM) 83,7 1,8587
Qatar (QA) 82,5 2,1
Russia (RU) 68,2 26,485
Saudi Arabia (SA) 82,3 1,16228
United Arab Emirates (UAE) 82,6 0,0079
United States (US) 86,4 1,2433
Venezuela (VZ) 58,8 5,6499
S o u r c e :  [Taxes on international trade…; Free monthly oil statistics…, 2016].
Figure 4. Taxes on international trade vs. trade freedom in top-oil producing countries, 2012
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In large economies, notably in Brazil, China, Russia, USA, a signifi cant part of the 
resource production (extracted or processed) is consumed domestically. In this case, a 
duty, imposed on resource export, could be regarded as a subsidy on domestic consump-
tion in terms of its price and quantity eff ects. Th e rents related to the oil production shift  
partially from the producer to the government (in the form of export tax revenue) and to 
the consumers (in the form of available resources) in the exporting country.
While in countries where a signifi cant part of resource is exported (notably, Gulf 
countries) an export duty only has distributional eff ects, i. e. rents shift  from the producer 
to the government in the form of export tax revenue. In such situation the producer can-
not shift  the export tax burden onto foreign consumers (by increasing the export price), 
since some part of resources will remain unsold.
In terms of trade freedom the obtained results coincide in some manner with state-
ments of WTO’s experts [Trade theory…, 2010], according to which resource-rich coun-
tries with high level of property rights protection and enforcement capability tend to 
maintain high level of trade freedom. But resource abundant economies where a large 
number of economic agents have access to the resource, harvesting technologies are more 
productive and overharvesting is hard to detect, prefer to restrict their trade liberalization.
Conclusion
In the paper we empirically tested the assumption that in transition economies the 
tax systems are more fl exible comparing with other developing and least developed coun-
tries which in turns allows more effi  cient reallocation of sources of revenue.
At various stages of trade liberalization the tariff  policies of low income and low mid-
dle income countries diff er. 
Developing and especially least developed countries maintain the high level of taxes 
on international trade since the tax systems in such economies are underdeveloped and 
they are able to generate returns primarily from easily collected indirect taxes like trade 
taxes. For this reason these states cannot effi  ciently promote trade liberalization, by elimi-
nating tariff  barriers.
For that matter transition countries are closer (according to the regression equation) 
to developed ones with upper middle and high income levels. Th eir tax systems allow 
faster shift ing from fi scal to regulatory tools of taxation compared with other developing 
countries.
As it was mentioned above the properties of exponential relationship relating to this 
topic imply that decrease of level of trade freedom will determine the increase at a quick 
rate the share of trade taxes in total revenue. 
Defi ning whether this increase is induced by direct rise of amounts of collected trade 
taxes or by “collapse” of economics at large accompanied by reduction of domestic tax and 
non-tax revenue, requires further investigation.
Th e model is limited in some manner by the data as of 2012, but this is conditioned 
by the available data, notably on share of trade taxes in total tax revenue. But the proposed 
methodology allows to use data of any time period.
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